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1 Introduction 
In 1995, the Centre of Technology Assessment in Stuttgart, Germany, 
presented a paper on the innovation system of its home region, the state 
of Baden-Württemberg in southwest Germany. The paper predicted a 
dire economic future for Baden-Württemberg – which, up to that point, 
had been regarded as an economic success story and a model region. 
Close to ten years later, we are able to look again at the economic and 
political situation of the region and can compare the analysis of the mid-
1990s with current conditions. The central thesis of the mid-nineties’ 
paper was that Baden-Württemberg was affected by a process of path 
dependent development which, although very successful in the past, 
would lead the region’s economy into a potential dead end street. A 
break away from the established paths of economic development was 
needed to guarantee future sustainable economic growth. Now (in 2003) 
we should be able to ask ourselves whether this analysis was correct. 
Has Baden-Württemberg in fact lost its leading position due to its con-
centration on established strengths or have significant changes taken 
place that altered the contours of the Baden-Württemberg model and 
made it more adaptive to changes in the world economy? Additionally, 
what role did regional policy play in this context? 
At first glance, Baden-Württemberg seems to be on the winning 
side again. In 1995 (especially with the most difficult year of 1993 in full 
view) all major economic indicators looked depressing. The performance 
of Baden-Württemberg was below the German average. In 2003, Baden-
Württemberg is – in spite of a new economic crisis - along with 
neighboring Bavaria the economically most successful region within 
Germany. To understand, whether the case of Baden-Württemberg is an 
example of the rise of new approaches, a (successful) continuation of old 
practices, or a restructuring of these old practices, we do not seek simply 
to rekindle debate about whether regional policy can fundamentally 
change regional development paths, but to go beyond this by question-
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ing and hopefully advancing underlying conceptual frameworks. In this 
chapter, we will first introduce the concept of path dependency, briefly 
review the main characteristics of the regional innovation system of Ba-
den-Württemberg, outline the lock-ins that have been identified in the 
mid-nineties, look to what extent these lock-in effects have in fact been 
roadblocks for further developments and whether they have been re-
moved. The main thesis of this chapter is that Baden-Württemberg’s 
success in the last years is the result of its staying “on–course.” The re-
gion has demonstrated its ability to introduce incremental reforms that 
combine old with new structural elements. This has been accomplished 
with the aid of crucial actors in the economic and political sectors who 
helped to change the guiding model of how to do things and who can be 
called “norm entrepreneurs.” 
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2 The Concept of Path Dependency 
To understand the changes that have taken place in Baden-
Württemberg’s economy, we refer first to the notion of path-
dependency, as this is the foundation of our analytical framework. Path-
dependent phenomena are caused by positive feedbacks. This implies 
that history matters in the sense that historical paths once chosen, even 
by coincidence, then rigidify and dominate future developments. A fa-
mous example of technological path-dependency is the often-quoted 
QWERTY phenomenon of the typewriter keyboard. The typewriter key-
board arrangement solved a temporary mechanical problem on one of 
the first typewriters. But soon it became the standard for generations to 
come, even though it has been considered by many to be inefficient and 
other, potentially better, solutions were available. 
2.1 Regional Path-dependency 
In considering how to frame and understand contemporary regional 
development, we begin with the assumption that in addition to techno-
logical trajectories (see Dosi, 1982), there are also regional trajectories. 
Technological knowledge is not only organized in large-scale technical 
systems (Hughes, 1987), in branches or professions, but also in regional 
economic areas. It can be expected that regions are also affected by path-
dependency, as institutions play an important role in concepts of re-
gional development. Moreover, they are often used as the explaining 
factor in these concepts. Regional trajectories consist of economic struc-
tures that have developed in relation to path-dependent technologies 
and embedding institutions. Existing regional structures, institutional 
thickness, existing relations of cooperation as well as approved policy 
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strategies are path-dependent – which implies, that they are hard to 
change. 
Regional economies can also be understood as spaces of collective 
(technological) learning. The crucial question is how such learning can 
be institutionalized. Learning itself can be seen as an evolutionary proc-
ess, following again path-dependent courses. Technological skills reflect 
local, regional, and national contexts and environments. Regions that are 
extraordinarily successful are those where the institutional context and 
regional networks closely complement the dominant industrial clusters 
of the region. 
Regional paths of development thus refer to accumulated compe-
tencies, methods, and technologies. This regional stock of knowledge is 
further developed within regional networks and can be closed towards 
inputs from outside. These processes of closure, however, might also 
lead to the development of lock-in situations that prevent regional insti-
tutions from adapting to changes in the environment and from learning 
new knowledge.  
Path-dependency can be maintained or fractured in particular ways 
in different locations. However, to make our position clearer, we will 
differentiate between three types: lock-in, incremental change and break-
through. Breakthrough means revolutionary changes of crucial economic 
structures and relating institutions. Incremental changes mean evolu-
tionary changes that do not set up new paths but try to lead old paths 
into a new direction (see Ackermann, 1999). Lock-ins, in contrast, are 
characterized by institutional and technological structures which are 
inefficient but cannot be changed. Grabher differentiates between three 
kinds of lock-ins: functional lock-in, cognitive lock-in, and political lock-
in (see Grabher, 1993). 
Functional lock-in means that close cooperation within strongly-
tied networks impedes contacts with other regions. Future trends that 
occur outside these networks may be overlooked, with external re-
sources poorly identified and used. Cognitive lock-in means that per-
sonal relations lead to shared common ideas, feelings and beliefs that 
prevent the adoption of new ideas. Political lock-in describes situations 
where historical trajectories of economic development are maintained by 
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cooperative relations between regional actors which are then unable to 
see and adopt new ways of thinking and policymaking. 
Generally, it is assumed that breakthroughs are difficult to achieve 
in the case of existing institutional thickness and established, distinct 
economic structures within a certain region. To the extent this is the case 
in Baden-Württemberg, we have to focus on the chances for incremental 
change.  
2.2 Guiding Models 
Ideas and informal rules, despite not being written down formally, are 
interpreted as social institutions and a huge part of governance can be 
attributed to them. In analyzing path-dependency in regional develop-
ment, one of the crucial questions is what role is played in regional de-
velopment by informal institutions such as guiding ideas or patterns of 
interpretation of new economic and social phenomena. The sociology of 
technology works with so-called “guiding models” in order to explain 
the genesis and management of new technologies (see Barben, 1997: 
133). We assume that the concept of guiding models can also be used in 
order to explain changes and developments in regional innovation sys-
tems. The notion of a guiding model encompasses two perspectives: on 
the one hand, we might be able to understand the genesis of new forms 
of economic behavior and aims; on the other hand we might be able to 
analyze political, economic and social interactions in managing these 
new forms (see Barben, 1997: 134). 
The guiding model concept looks for the role of ideas about given 
or future possibilities on how to do things. Such ideas condense into 
concepts which look ahead and which act as frames for orientating in-
terpretations, thinking, decisions, and actions for individual and collec-
tive actors within regional innovation systems (see Dierkes et al., 1992: 
11). Neither markets, nor hierarchies are able to solve specific co-
ordination problems in social networks or in regional innovation sys-
tems respectively. Instead, the existence of regional guiding models ren-
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ders the available frames of orientation (see Abel, 1997: 71). In this way, 
guiding models manage to connect different logics of action, as this is 
the case in regional innovation systems, when political, economic and 
scientific actors meet and develop ideas on how to stimulate innovation. 
Thus, guiding models reflect goals, towards which discourses are di-
rected, or lines of orientation that structure them (see Dierkes and Marz, 
1992: 16). 
In answering the question of how such guiding models come into 
existence, we have to leave the structural level and focus on the individ-
ual level, as it is usually crucial actors with the “power of definition” 
who shape and reshape guiding models. These actors take up ideas that 
are suitable to become guiding models and place them in discussions as 
long as they are established. However, even for very powerful actors it is 
not possible to just implant guiding models within a region. Instead 
negotiation processes between different powerful actors are needed to 
get relevant social groups to accept the new guiding model - and it is not 
before this happens, that we can consider a mere idea as a guiding 
model (see Abel, 1997: 74). In this perspective, guiding models can only 
be shaped and reshaped but never created out of nothing. This assump-
tion brings us back to the concept of path dependency. 
In the social sciences “…the role of ideas in particular has gained 
greater attention. Social constructivism has developed as a school of 
thought committed to explicating the way ideas are developed, dissemi-
nated, and implemented as public policies” (Cox, 2001: 495). Following 
the idea that social norms can be changed by norm-entrepreneurs, some 
political scientists have argued that political leaders are able to overcome 
the path-dependent constraints of existing policy institutions. This is 
consistent with our view that the relations between institutions are com-
plementary: change in informal institutions may end up in changing 
formal institutions and the outlook of a regional innovation system. As 
guiding models can be changed by crucial actors within a society, these 
actors might be able to overcome the path-dependent constraints of ex-
isting policy and social institutions. By initializing new discourses, fram-
ing issues and redefining old models and ideas of how to do things, re-
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gional development can be realized by integrating old and new institu-
tions.  
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3 The Regional Innovation System of 
Baden-Württemberg 
3.1 The Success Story 
The federal state of Baden-Württemberg in the south-west of Germany 
has been looked upon by many as a regional model economy up to the 
early nineties (Cooke and Morgan, 1990; Gabriel, 1990; Hassink, 1992; 
Maier, 1989; Sabel, 1989; Schmitz, 1992; Semlinger, 1993). With low levels 
of unemployment, high rates of industrial investment and export, a 
reputation for high quality, and well-engineered products, it seemed to 
have overcome major problems of many regional or national economies: 
namely how to establish and maintain competitive advantage. A high 
share of specialized and export-oriented capital goods producers, a 
dominance of flexible small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), and a 
high capacity for technological innovation within these firms were seen 
as decisive characteristics. The region enjoyed decades of economic 
prosperity because of its skilled labor, cooperative industrial relations, 
well-developed research structures, state and national industrial policies, 
and close and long-term relations between banks and companies. Social 
scientists interested in explaining the region’s economic success laid 
emphasis on institutional factors. They characterized the region as com-
ing close to the model of an industrial district (see Sabel, 1989; Schmitz, 
1992; Semlinger, 1994; Rehfeld, 1995) and endowed with a relatively self-
contained regional economy and system of governance (Amin and 
Thrift, 1995: 7). They attributed the economic success of the region to a 
successful partnership among state government, dominant industries, 
financial institutions, research institutions, and universities (Wallace, 
1994: 68). 
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Baden-Württemberg is one of the “Four Motors of Europe” regions 
– a group of European regions regarded as being particularly successful 
in generating economic growth. It has earned this “nomination” thanks 
to its outstanding economic successes. Baden-Württemberg’s research 
intensity of 3.9 percent of its GDP (Germany: 2.3%; European Union: 
1.8%) is way above average. Its employment rate (percentage of popula-
tion aged 15-64) is well above the German and European level (1999: 
69.5% in comparison with 65.4% and 62.8%); its unemployment rate well 
below these levels (1999: 5.1% in comparison with 8.9% and 9.4%); and 
its rate of European patent applications per million people (average for 
the period 1997-1999) is the highest of all European NUTS2-regions 
(416.4 in comparison with 227.3 in Germany and 119.4 in Europe).1 
 
3.2 Revisionism 
Baden-Württemberg’s economic statistics are largely undisputed. How-
ever, starting in the early 1990s economic problems began to strike this 
model region. In these years, it became clear that we had been talking 
about a highly stylized success story. This story had been retold many 
times after the major contributions by Piore and Sabel (1984), Herrigel 
(1993) and others. What followed were revisionist interpretations, for 
example by Heidenreich and Krauss (1998), which demonstrated that 
some of the traits that had been considered to be the cornerstones of the 
Baden-Württemberg model were hard to find in empirical reality and 
seemed more to be properties deducted from the theory of industrial 
districts and flexible specialization. This section reviews several of the 
key features previously identified as important in the Baden-
Württemberg model in the light of more recent evidence and reflection. 
Cooperation. Baden-Württemberg is certainly a region with consid-
erable institutional thickness. Intensive cooperation and communication 
networks within a region are supposed to give rise to synergies that, 
according to the concept of flexible specialization, represent an impor-
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tant precondition for the success of industrial districts. In our case, how-
ever, one must clearly differentiate between vertical and horizontal co-
operation patterns. In Baden-Württemberg, the significance of vertical 
relations between suppliers and buyers is very high. This reflects the 
extent to which companies in Baden-Württemberg’s three core branches 
of automotive, electrical and mechanical engineering are tied in regional 
clusters. However, cooperation between potentially competing compa-
nies on a horizontal level seems rather the exception than the rule. In the 
industrial core sectors, relations between potential competitors are far 
less significant than the concepts of flexible specialization would suggest 
(Schmitz, 1992; Cooke et al., 1993). Based on a representative survey of 
West German mechanical engineering companies, Kerst and Steffensen 
(1995) were able to demonstrate that the number of cooperating compa-
nies in Baden-Württemberg is by no means above average. The share of 
cooperating mechanical engineering companies in Baden-Württemberg 
(1993: 37%) is on par with the West German average (36%). Therefore, it 
is doubtful that there is a higher incidence of cooperation activities be-
tween competing companies in Baden-Württemberg than in other Ger-
man regions.  
Small and Medium Sized Enterprises. The assumption that the struc-
ture of Baden-Württemberg’s economy is more strongly determined by 
small and mid-sized “Mittelstand” companies than the rest of the Ger-
man economy is also a misconception. Based on the average size of the 
regional companies, there is no difference between Germany and Baden-
Württemberg. On the contrary, it can be argued that the prosperity of 
Baden-Württemberg’s regional economy is based on the success of a 
large number of big companies (such as DaimlerChrysler, Porsche, 
Bosch, and IBM). 
Technology Transfer. In the conventional Baden-Württemberg model, 
it was suggested that the region’s major research universities and its 
universities for applied sciences were closely geared towards the de-
mands of local industry. Large firms were believed to have close coop-
erative relationships with the research universities, while SMEs cooper-
ated with the universities of applied sciences. However, our research 
indicates that linkages of technology and knowledge transfer differ from 
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this model. Bigger companies (more than 500 employees) are cooperat-
ing with the Steinbeis technology transfer centers (a system that was 
designed for small firms). Although most very small companies make 
almost no use of the institutional knowledge available in the regions, 
about 5 percent of the small companies (up to ten employees) in the re-
gion make use of the Steinbeis system. The importance of Steinbeis is 
also mirrored in data that show that 17.5 percent of the companies that 
are looking for support for the start of an innovation process are direct-
ing their enquiries there. At the same time, some 55 percent of the re-
spondents, named their bank as a significant source of assistance, with 
47 for chambers of industry and commerce, 23 percent for chambers of 
artisans, and 21 percent for trade associations (IHK, 2002:32). 
Core Industries as Core Problem. Drawing on the general discussion 
about economic development and industrial policy in Baden-
Württemberg, the critics held that Baden-Württemberg’s past success 
might have become the very reason for the region’s comparatively slow 
orientation towards new industries. Grabher (1993) has aptly described 
how the Ruhr region became locked in on a once successful path of de-
velopment, leading the region into deep economic crisis. According to 
Morgan (1994: 11), it would be “surprising” if some of the problems de-
scribed by Grabher were not applicable to the Baden-Württemberg case. 
Indeed, Braczyk et al. (1995) identify several of these problems. They 
point to the slow adaptation of Baden-Württemberg’s industry to the 
“Japanese challenge” as a case of “cognitive lock-in” and to the bias of 
Baden-Württemberg’s technology policy towards the core industries as a 
case of “political lock-in.” They also detect a “functional lock-in” in Ba-
den-Württemberg’s high level of economic integration: the fact that the 
three industrial core sectors are so closely interwoven makes the whole 
region particularly vulnerable to economic crises. 
In a similar vein, Heidenreich and Krauss (1998: 223) point out that 
the major companies in Baden-Württemberg’s core sectors are quite re-
luctant to source services from external providers. As a result, opportu-
nities for communication and cooperation outside the established trajec-
tories are missed and economic restructuring is hampered by barriers to 
learning. Heidenreich and Krauss (1998: 229; see also ifo, 1995) further-
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more show that Baden-Württemberg’s system of R&D and technology 
transfer strongly concentrates on the three industrial core sectors and on 
advanced technology rather than on the most advanced areas of tech-
nology. 
The symptoms of the limitations of Baden-Württemberg’s regional 
production system became increasingly apparent in the first half of the 
1990s. During the economic crisis between 1992 and 1994, the economy 
of Baden-Württemberg suffered more than the other states of former 
West Germany. The GDP declined by 4.7 percent (1993), while the un-
employment rate rose from 3.7 percent (1991) to 8.7 percent (1997). This 
crisis primarily affected the economic core region of Baden-
Württemberg, the region of Stuttgart (see Krauss, 1999: 359). The key 
sectors of Stuttgart’s economy were greatly affected by this worsening 
situation. The automotive, mechanical engineering, and electronics and 
electrical engineering industries all underwent processes of personnel 
retrenchment. Between 1980 and 1995, more than 15 percent of the em-
ployment in mechanical engineering was lost; in the electronics and elec-
trical engineering industry, the decline amounted to almost 14 percent of 
the jobs. Employment related to the production of electronic data proc-
essing systems declined by 10.5 percent between 1980 and 1996 (see Sta-
tistisches Landesamt, 1997). Long-term employment prognoses for these 
sectors were quite dim, too. In 1994, one research institute predicted 
employment to drop between 1991 and 2010 in Baden-Württemberg’s 
electronics and electrical engineering industry by 9 percent, in the me-
chanical engineering industry by 15 percent and in the automotive in-
dustry by 26 percent (Saebetzki, 1994: 92). 
The question was asked, given Stuttgart’s exceptional success in 
capital goods industries, why its economy did not succeed in staging a 
stronger reorientation to sectors promising greater growth potential. It 
seemed that Stuttgart’s economy was failing to stake out greater shares 
in new areas such as information and communications technology, new 
materials, biotechnology, environmental and power technology, micro-
system technology, and production oriented services (Faust et al., 1995), 
although the industrial, structural, and institutional preconditions in 
each of the cited areas were certainly not unfavorable. These questions 
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lead invariably to the inertia of established production structures. Let us 
therefore look at the dominant features of the innovation system of 
Stuttgart/Mittlerer Neckar. 
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4 Stuttgart as the Core Region 
It is apparent that when people speak of Baden-Württemberg, they are in 
fact talking about its core region of Stuttgart and Mittlerer Neckar. We 
note that Baden-Württemberg features several economic regions with 
very distinct characteristics and problems. However, to be consistent 
with past practice, in this chapter we too will focus on the core Stuttgart-
Mittlerer Neckar region. Data for Baden-Württemberg will only be used 
if relevant data for the core region are missing and the data can be con-
sidered as adequate indicators for the core region as well. 
The region of Stuttgart comprises, besides the city of Stuttgart itself, 
five adjacent administrative districts and is home to more than 2.5 mil-
lion inhabitants. Over one million people, more than a quarter of all em-
ployees in Baden-Württemberg, are employed in that area.2 Although 
there are other economic centers in Baden-Württemberg – above all the 
regions of Karlsruhe and Mannheim-Heidelberg – the Stuttgart region is 
the most important of them. The region of Stuttgart had a gross domestic 
product of € 55,400 per employee in 1998, which is 8 percent above the 
Baden-Württemberg average and 15 percent above the German average. 
This is impressive but has also to be seen in comparison with other Ger-
man agglomerations. The comparable data for Munich is € 64,600 per 
employee. The lower rate for Stuttgart still reflects the major importance 
of the industrial sector in Baden-Württemberg. Other agglomerations 
have accumulated production-oriented services which feature a high 
gross product per employee. In Stuttgart, more than a quarter of all em-
ployees are still within the manufacturing sector. In Hamburg or Co-
logne, the rate is around 10 percent. 
The export orientation of a region reflects its ability to stand firm in 
the international competition. With an export ratio of 47 percent in the 
manufacturing sector, Stuttgart is the most export-intensive region in 
Germany. Only the Munich region achieves similar success. Stuttgart’s 
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unemployment rate is among the lowest in all of Germany. Only Munich 
again, as a comparable location, has a similarly low rate (4.1 percent in 
October 2001). 
The Stuttgart-Mittlerer Neckar core area has about 45 percent of all 
R&D capacities of Baden-Württemberg. The research intensity of private 
companies in the region is 4.6 higher than the German average. It is still 
2.2 times the Baden-Württemberg average. It features two universities, 
various universities for applied sciences, and vocational colleges. Fur-
thermore there is a high number of institutions of extra-university re-
search like institutes of the Fraunhofer and the Max-Planck associations, 
institutes of the industrial joint research group, contract research insti-
tutes at the university and a number of organizations for technology 
transfer most notably the Steinbeis Foundation. The Steinbeis-Stiftung 
für Wirtschaftsförderung (Steinbeis Foundation for Economic Develop-
ment) is a statewide umbrella organization. In 1998, the technology 
transfer related activities became a private business activity and there-
fore were outsourced to a private firm called Steinbeis GmbH & Co. für 
Technologietransfer. This company maintains a network of about 500 
centers3 for technology transfer, in most cases close to a Fachhochschule 
(university of applied sciences). The Steinbeis-foundation over the 1990s 
has developed itself into a more effective, market-oriented organization. 
Only “successful” professors can now lead a Steinbeis center. If a center 
fails to win contracts in a satisfying manner for a certain period of time 
then the center will be closed. This is one of the mechanisms to link pro-
fessors to the changing demands of industry. 
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5 The Present State of the Regional  
Economy 
The assumption behind the questions asked by the critics of the regional 
innovation system of Stuttgart is obvious. Innovativeness is considered 
to be the result of communication and cooperation opportunities outside 
of historically evolved and institutionally and organizationally rein-
forced trajectories. Heidenreich and Krauss assumed that such commu-
nication and cooperation opportunities did not exist in Stuttgart. The 
implication was that barriers to learning and not the maturity of Stutt-
gart’s product range formed a major obstacle on the road to new innova-
tion-promoting company strategies. 
As noted in the previous section, when looking at the situation to-
day, there is little doubt that Stuttgart is again performing very well 
economically. In view of this, we have to ask whether the critical devel-
opments, which had been identified in the mid-1990s have been changed 
and the rule of path dependency has been broken up. The question is: 
what is the reason for the good economic performance? We have to an-
swer the question whether developments can be interpreted as an exam-
ple of breakthrough or incremental change: The changes we will find in 
our analysis will be interpreted in the context of “lock-in” or “break-
through.” 
As it is difficult to indicate the exact demarcation between incre-
mental and revolutionary changes, we assume that the variety of 
changes can be localized on a scale where one pole denotes a phenome-
non which explicitly indicates lock-in and the other pole denotes a phe-
nomenon which indicates an absolute breakthrough.  
While the economic data seem to be comforting, some of the dis-
turbing trends recognized in the mid-1990s have kept stable. In compari-
son to Germany, the Baden-Württemberg regional R&D system contin-
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ues to be characterized by a specialization on technologies relevant for 
the construction of machines and cars. The dominance of the manufac-
turing sector has not been severely challenged. In Stuttgart-Mittlerer 
Neckar, three sectors remain particularly important measured in terms 
of both employment and sales: the automotive industry, the mechanical 
engineering and the electronics and electrical engineering industry (see 
Table 11.1). Among these three, the car industry stands out more than 
ever before. Stuttgart maintains and, indeed, has further developed “the 
largest, thickest, and the most powerful auto cluster in Europe” (Mor-
gan, 1994: 37). As this cluster has strongly influenced not only the re-
gion’s economy but also its institutions and culture, it is no exaggeration 
to still portray Stuttgart as a “car city.” Let us look more closely at the 
three sectors and recent developments there. 
 
 
Table 5.1: Stuttgart - Mittlerer Neckar: Employment and sales turnover 
of the most important sub-sectors of the manufacturing sector (2000) 
Industrial Sector Share of regional 
employment 
Share of re-
gional sales 
turnover 
Car manufacturing 25.9% 43.6% 
Electrical engineering 19.2% 15.4% 
Mechanical engineering 18.8% 18.8% 
Manufacturing sector (total) 100 % 100% 
Source: Industrie- und Handelskammer Stuttgart, various publications 
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5.1 Electrical Engineering 
Electrical engineering comprises a wide variety of activities: the produc-
tion of office equipment, computers, electronics, precision engineering 
and optics. This broad definition has to be kept in mind when looking at 
the data. Electrical engineering is – in terms of turnover – the third big-
gest manufacturing sector in the region of Stuttgart. With more than € 
11.9 billion sales turnover, electrical engineering comprised 15.4 percent 
of the region’s manufacturing sector. The growth rates of this sector are, 
however, below the German and the Baden-Württemberg average in 
spite of the dramatic increases during the boom years of the New Econ-
omy. Nonetheless, 56 percent of the sales are from exports, which is well 
above the Baden-Württemberg average. Growth in this sector is mainly 
due to export activities. Domestic demand is lagging behind considera-
bly. 
The sector of electrical engineering employed 75,800 people (2000). 
The sector is thus the second largest industrial employer. Large compa-
nies like Alcatel, Bosch, IBM, and Hewlett Packard are responsible for 
these figures. Part of the electrical engineering sector is strongly affili-
ated with the automotive sector. Besides Bosch, this is mainly due for a 
number of SMEs.  
In spite of the fact that electrical engineering is statistically part of 
the manufacturing sector, growth is mostly due to growing service-
oriented activities. Direct production-oriented activities continue to de-
cline quite significantly. In the Stuttgart region, 39 percent of the people 
engaged in R&D activities are working in the electrical engineering sec-
tor. This fact signifies that the sector is very research-intensive. 17.3 per-
cent of the employees are working in R&D. In the automotive sector, the 
respective number is 10.6 percent and in mechanical engineering 9.2 
percent. 
More than the mechanical engineering and the automotive sector, 
the field of electrical engineering has become the object of immense 
transformations. As is the case with the other sectors, the traditional 
strengths of Stuttgart were in the manufacturing realm. However, the 
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major companies of the region (Bosch, Alcatel, IBM, Hewlett Packard) 
have downscaled or completely closed down their production facilities. 
This loss was not compensated by increasing employment in services or 
content. On the other hand, this sector is also much more open to new 
entries. Fifty-one percent of all technology-oriented/technology-based 
new firm creations are IT related. The machine tool industry accounts 
only for 12 percent. Car manufacturing does not appear among the lead-
ing sectors for new firms. It must be mentioned, however, that a signifi-
cant proportion of new firm creations nevertheless are effected by firms 
providing input for the car manufacturing industry, and thus are not 
counted as automotive but are nevertheless directly linked to it. Car 
manufacturing and electrical engineering are interlocked to a significant 
degree. Mechanical engineering and automotive also show a sizeable 
degree of interconnections, while this is hardly visible for mechanical 
engineering and electrical engineering. 
5.2 Mechanical Engineering 
Mechanical engineering is the second biggest industrial sector in the 
Stuttgart region. In 2000, about 453 companies were active in this sector 
with an average employment of 164 people. This illustrates the SME 
character of this sector. The sector is very heterogeneous, but it also fea-
tures, as indicated above, a number of significant companies geared to-
wards the automotive sector. 
Contrary to electrical engineering, the mechanical engineering sec-
tor is experiencing a growth rate that is well above the Baden-
Württemberg and the German average. The share of the Stuttgart region 
in the mechanical engineering industry in Baden-Württemberg is above 
one third. Similar to the electrical engineering sector, export demand is 
maintaining growth in the face of consistently weak domestic demand. 
The export rate of the mechanical engineering industry is 54 percent 
(2000), which is above the Baden-Württemberg average. 
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With respect to employment, the mechanical engineering industry 
is the third largest industrial sector in the Stuttgart region. In spite of the 
overall favorable figures, employment is shrinking. The loss of employ-
ment is significantly higher than in the rest of Germany. The continuing 
economic success of this sector, which does not find its imprint in the 
employment data, is due to a continuing high tech orientation and (re-
sulting) significant productivity increases. Fifty-five percent of the com-
panies in the mechanical engineering sector spend more than 3.5 percent 
of their turnover on R&D.  
 
5.3 Automotive Industry 
The automotive industry represents by far the most important industrial 
activity in the Stuttgart region. The global automotive sector is undergo-
ing a severe process of restructuring, which has important impacts on 
primary manufacturers as well as their suppliers. This reorganization is 
taking place on a worldwide scale and along the entire value chain. 
However, this restructuring has helped the Stuttgart manufacturers to 
stay on top and strengthen their position.  
There are approximately 100 companies in Stuttgart’s automotive 
sector. They are responsible for 43.6 percent of the industrial output in 
the region. This signifies an important growth trend. In 1980, car manu-
facturing accounted for 28.7 percent of the total output. In 1992, its share 
has dwindled to 27.3 percent, but since then has steadily risen up to 43.6 
percent in 2000. 25.9 percent of all industrial employees are to be found 
there. It is therefore also the biggest employer in the region. Over one 
hundred thousand workers were employed in 2000, with employment 
growing faster than in the rest of Baden-Württemberg as well as in Ger-
many. 
This development is in some way special to the Stuttgart region. 
Not all manufacturers in Germany and especially the core manufactur-
ing regions were as “lucky” as Stuttgart with DaimlerChrysler, Porsche, 
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and Bosch (the world’s second largest automotive supplier). Stuttgart 
did better than the rest of Baden-Württemberg as well as the rest of 
Germany. A special feature is again the export orientation. In 2000, ex-
ports amounted to 65 percent of all production, up from 57 percent in 
1996. 
Almost one-half of the employees working in the automotive sector 
are fulfilling manufacturing duties. As in other sectors, direct manufac-
turing tasks are declining, however, and services and R&D- related ac-
tivities are solely responsible for the recent job growth. Car manufactur-
ing is also very research-intensive. Close to 70 percent of companies 
spend more than 3.5 percent of their turnover on R&D. 
As mentioned above car manufacturing has been subject to a global 
restructuring for some years. This global restructuring has found its 
imprint on the regional level. Stuttgart has benefited from both its strong 
export orientation in the sector as well as the decision of the major play-
ers to turn Stuttgart into a worldwide hub for car manufacturing. All the 
important functions for car manufacturing are present in the region. 
Stuttgart could well have fallen victim to the merger negotiations be-
tween Daimler and Chrysler. Stuttgart, however, succeeded to get out of 
these negotiations as a strengthened partner. This put the region also in 
contrast to the developments in Germany or worldwide, where several 
regions had to suffer severe losses.  
5.4 Patent statistics 
Stuttgart is the leading region in Germany with respect to patent activi-
ties. This holds both true for the number of patents per 100,000 inhabi-
tants as well as employees (1998). The ratio is double the German aver-
age and 18 percent above the Baden-Württemberg average. The relative 
position of the region, however, has changed. Other locations like Mu-
nich have shown a higher growth rate in recent years and were able to 
close the gap with Stuttgart. Patent statistics also demonstrate clearly 
that the Stuttgart economy develops along stable trajectories. Patents are 
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concentrated in car manufacturing and mechanical engineering, with a 
somewhat lower specialization in electrical engineering. The data also 
show clearly, that over the last decade new patent specializations were 
not being established, in spite of all the political efforts to the contrary. 
The degree of specialization has in fact even increased for the case of car 
manufacturing and to a more limited degree in mechanical engineering. 
The most important single companies with respect to patenting activities 
remained Bosch, Porsche, DaimlerChrysler, and Alcatel (although the 
latter’s  significance is reducing). The technological strengths of the re-
gion undoubtedly are with car manufacturing and technologies of spe-
cial relevance for car manufacturing, including auto-related  IT. The 
combination of excellence in these fields remains an essential compara-
tive advantage for the region. 
5.5 “Old” vs. “New” Economy Trends 
The data presented in previous sections show that industry sectors that 
were identified as in “critical” condition in the 1990s continue to domi-
nate the Stuttgart regional economy. This also holds true for the follow-
ing aspects. The share of the Baden-Württemberg economy in the 
worldwide trade of R&D-intensive goods has declined constantly (see 
Tables 11.2 and Figure 11.1). The role of Baden-Württemberg in (non-
automotive) high-technology sectors has never been that strong and it 
continues to decline rather sharply. The most radical downturn is to be 
observed in the electronics sector (see Figure 11.1). Here Baden-
Württemberg has fallen victim to the above-mentioned trend of a radical 
decrease in the employment in the hardware part of the electronics sec-
tor. The major companies (IBM, Alcatel-SEL, Bosch, Siemens, Hewlett 
Packard, and Sony) are still reducing their manufacturing capacities in 
the region (in the case of IBM none is left) and the service oriented em-
ployment in the same sector could not be built up in comparable quanti-
ties (see Seufert, 2000). 
G. Fuchs / S. Wassermann: The Regional Innovation System 23 
 
 
 
Table 5.2: Importance of high technology commodities in selected coun-
tries and regions (Nominal scale) 
 
National ranking (among G7 coun-
tries) 
1991 1995 1999 
  Germany  3 3 3 
Ranking of seven comparable small 
countries and regions 
   
  Netherlands 1 1 1 
  Sweden 2 2 2 
  Switzerland 4 3 3 
  Finland 7 5 3 
  North Rhine-Westphalia 5 6 5 
  Baden-Württemberg 3 3 6 
  Austria 6 7 7 
 
Source: OECD – International Trade by Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 
2000: Note: For Germany the rank among the G7 countries is given. The 
seven other entities are compared amongst themselves. 
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Figure 5.1: Products with high technology content and Baden-
Württemberg’s share of world exports in this category (by sector)  
Source: OECD – International Trade by Commodity Statistics, Rev. 3, 
2000.  
 
The concentration on the three core sectors mirrors another poten-
tial weakness of the regional innovation system: The economy is concen-
trated on markets which feature an under average growth on the world 
market. Goods, which experience the greatest growth potential world-
wide, are only represented in a below-average degree. The even increas-
ing concentration on core competences has led to the fact that Baden-
Württemberg has lost its lead in more areas than it has achieved new 
leads (see Lay, Eggers, and Rainfurth, 1999). For example, the regional 
economy has not secured a strong position in advanced services. Of 
course, there has been some growth in services, but this increase mostly 
reflects the general German trend. Data do not reveal that, in Stuttgart or 
in Baden-Württemberg for that matter, services have any special, pro-
nounced growth dynamic.  
Overall, this presents us with a conflicting picture. On the one hand 
we see that most of the traits of Stuttgart’s economy that have been con-
sidered to be problematic are still there, in certain ways even extenuated. 
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But we also see that the Stuttgart region remains one of the leading re-
gions of Germany and has done better in recent years than the rest of the 
less industrialized and more service oriented country. The strong con-
centration on specific technological fields was in the second half of the 
1990s a major reason for the above average performance. While some 
regions declined and others moved upward, Stuttgart kept its leading 
position. In this respect, the crisis interpretation of the mid-1990s has to 
be reassessed. One of the leading justifications for the assessment of the 
mid-1990s was that the “old” economy was on the decline. Yet, the sub-
sequent experiences of Stuttgart demonstrated that the “old” economy 
was well able to stay alive and prosper – under specific circumstances. 
The discussion after the demise of the “New Economy” bubble has 
shown that the essential component for economic well-being is not a 
single-minded promotion of the new economy, but a blending of new 
and old economy elements. Here, Stuttgart’s industrial sector has done 
quite well. It has kept its R&D expenditures high, has absorbed new 
knowledge for developing products that are more competitive, intro-
duced organizational reforms, and has slowly increased its services 
component. Moreover, there have been other important changes that are 
not adequately mirrored in the statistics, which will be discussed in the 
next section. 
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6 The Norm Entrepreneurs 
At an early stage, the state government of Baden-Württemberg was 
aware of a potential lock-in situation in the region’s economic develop-
ment. The person symbolizing the search for a new role for Baden-
Württemberg and its core region of Stuttgart was the then minister 
president Lothar Späth. Already in the late-1980s, he tasked expert 
commissions to consider the situation and make recommendations. This 
resulted in a number of activities to tackle lock-in phenomena and to 
develop new industry and service sectors and to build up of a number of 
new institutions in the field of science. Most prominently among the 
sectors targeted were biotechnology, multimedia and producer-oriented 
services. Späth was aware of the potential difficulties, but reinterpreted 
these as opportunities worth taking a risk. In this sense, he viewed glob-
alization as an option to be taken up proactively. 
In addition, many actors in the region in the early 1990s began to 
share the assumption that Stuttgart faced not a temporary crisis but pro-
found structural changes, most importantly with the trend towards the 
globalization of markets, towards the decline of mature industries and 
towards the rise of highly innovative, knowledge-intensive, and service-
oriented industries (New Economy). A broad agreement gradually came 
into existence on the view that Stuttgart could not successfully cope with 
these changes merely by concentrating on its traditional key industries. 
Instead, the call for a fundamental restructuring of Stuttgart’s regional 
economy became louder. In the industrial sector, Jürgen Schrempp – the 
most outspoken representative of treating globalization as a positive 
option – became the head of DaimlerChrysler. While the activities of the 
politicians were mainly in the realm of image building, changing the 
priorities of funding, looking for new policy instruments, constructing 
new institutions, Schrempp transformed the regionally based company 
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Daimler-Benz into a globally oriented and globally based company 
DaimlerChrysler. Let us look at these developments in more detail. 
6.1 The automotive sector 
Contrary to many prophecies, Stuttgart’s automotive sector has not de-
clined. Rather, it has grown in importance in recent years. Underlying 
this development was the strategic decision to further develop the Stutt-
gart region into one of the few worldwide important centers of compe-
tence for this industry. Stuttgart features a nearly unique combination of 
managerial, production, research, and infrastructure components. The 
merger of DaimlerChrysler has further strengthened the position of 
Stuttgart. Even a worldwide decline in the automotive sector will most 
probably hit Stuttgart less hard than other less well-positioned regions. 
Furthermore, Stuttgart has strengthened its position within Germany 
with respect to both turnover and employment. Compared to the reces-
sion year of 1993 in which every seventeenth job was dependent on the 
automobile industry, this relationship has jumped today to every four-
teenth job. Considering only the manufacturing sector, dependence on 
automobiles has increased from every sixth to every fifth working place. 
It has to be said that the adaptive capacities of the industrial core are 
remarkable. This can be especially demonstrated for the case of the car 
industry by its successful turn to global markets over the 1990s. Exports 
rose from 43 percent (1991) to 61 percent (2000). While in 1995, 22 per-
cent of all German exports came from Baden-Württemberg, in 2000 this 
figure climbed to 27 percent. Between 1995 and 2000, more than 50 per-
cent of the increase in the region’s valued-added output can be contrib-
uted to the car industry, and its share of regional industrial output has 
increased from 16 to 21 percent. Successful organizational reforms have 
been implemented, and an adaptive system of input suppliers was fur-
ther developed, which expanded even more strongly than the core 
manufacturers. While in 1993 191,000 people were employed in the core 
producing companies, 84,000 (30 percent) were with the suppliers. In 
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1998, 193,000 were with the core producing companies and 142,000 (40 
percent) with the suppliers. In the process of the merger between Daim-
ler and Chrysler, a number of U.S. suppliers set up shop in the region of 
Stuttgart. This did not imply manufacturing capacities, but new market-
ing, service and research and development facilities.  
The implication of these developments surely is that the region is 
very dependent on the strategies of the main companies. This is not only 
DaimlerChrysler but also Porsche, which staged a broadly admired turn 
around in the 1990s, along with three further car-producing companies. 
Next to these big manufacturing firms is a cluster of worldwide leading 
supplier firms, engineering and research companies, service companies, 
fuel cell cooperation networks, regional competence centers, institutes of 
the University of Stuttgart, traffic telematics companies, and regional 
pilot projects dealing with the future of mobility (e.g. STORM, Mobilist). 
6.2 Parallel institution building 
One means of increasing regional innovative capacity is by creating 
institutions. This often proves an inadequate solution, however (see 
Amin and Thrift, 1995). Harder to achieve is the development of a new 
regional identity and the generation of synergy effects between institu-
tional and technological development paths. This is the task facing espe-
cially those regions which have been very successful up to now, and 
which have achieved a high level of technological competence in the so-
called mature industrial sectors. For these regions, the hitherto estab-
lished institutions and the institutional thickness thus achieved can even 
become an additional problem, since training, research and funding 
facilities tend to stabilize the traditional patterns of industrial develop-
ment. Against a background of intensified global competition, this prob-
lem of institutional inertia and restrictions deserves special attention. 
The state government of Baden-Württemberg over the last decade 
was fully aware of the problems of institutional inertia. This institutional 
inertia has been analyzed in various studies that did show that main 
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pillars of the Baden-Württemberg model were concentrating on the core 
industries and had difficulties adapting to the new industries. The Stein-
beis foundation, for example, did not play any significant role in the 
early development of the multimedia or the biotechnology industry. The 
response of the state government was a strategy that combined parallel 
institution building with a reform of old institutions. Parallel institution 
building means that for the support and promotion of new industries, 
new institutions were created. For instance, in the multimedia sector the 
Medien- und Filmgesellschaft Baden-Württemberg (Media and Movie 
Association of Baden-Württemberg) was created. In the case of biotech-
nology, a state agency was established and various regional forms of 
institution building have been supported. It is noteworthy that these 
attempts – at least in the beginning - totally bypassed the established 
institutional structures and had few connections with these structures. 
The further development of existing capacities and the search for 
new product and production concepts is thus being supported by many 
new institutions as well as by expert commissions, a dense network of 
regional technology transfer institutions and industry policy initiatives. 
The Future Commission Economy 2000, appointed in 1992, gave the 
starting signal for the search for “ways out of the crisis.” This was fol-
lowed by the Innovationsoffensive with a fund of DM1 billion (€ 0.52 
billion) committed to new technical faculties, data highways, biotechnol-
ogy parks, software centers. In 1994, an Innovation Council was set up 
and this council developed, among other things, proposals for creating a 
biotechnology agency, a microsystem forum and better computer facili-
ties in schools. Within the context of a “Future Campaign” (Zukunftsof-
fensive) the state government has realized these proposals since 1996. 
An additional DM1 billion was invested in upgrading technical colleges, 
colleges of advanced vocational studies, universities, clinics, schools and 
libraries. Since 1997, the state government has supported the establish-
ment and expansion of five biotech parks at Freiburg, Heidelberg, 
Esslingen and Reutlingen/Tübingen with a total of € 12.5 million. Sup-
port has also been given to business start-ups, networked research pro-
jects, and regional trade fairs. Start-up companies for example have been 
supported by subsidy programs, investment shares, and a venture capi-
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tal fund that was set up in 1998. Within the framework of the programs 
“Young Innovators” and “Start-up Founders on Campus,” the govern-
ment supported entrepreneurs from universities and research institutes. 
From the regional perspective, the most important element has 
been the foundation of the Association Region of Stuttgart in 1994. This 
was done in the form of a decision by the state government and is a 
unique development. No other region became equipped in a similar 
manner. The most important task of the association is the furthering of 
economic development. It was clear from the beginning that this associa-
tion should be primarily concerned with new sectors and new types of 
activities to support structural change in the region. The association is 
the product of a top-down development, represents the core of a new 
regional order, and is in the center of other institutional reforms as well. 
The association was active in the development and implementation of 
major projects. It organized regional capacities and resources in order to 
be able for the region to participate in national as well as European com-
petitions for money. Complex partnerships were built up, organized, 
and moderated.  
The operationalization of the aims of the association was done 
gradually via concrete projects. In an exemplary manner one can name 
projects for site development, attracting new investors, network projects 
like the Regional Dialogue Car Production, MediaRegio Stuttgart, 
PUSH!, Mobilist, BioRegio, regional competence centers, the support 
program environmental technology and a host of marketing and image 
campaigns. These are still examples that show how within a short time 
frame the agency has developed its tasks. It also shows that in various 
fields there was nothing much in existence before. For example, previ-
ously site marketing was not considered necessary by the city of Stutt-
gart, because the local politicians believed that Stuttgart as a strong eco-
nomic area would not need any further marketing.  
Central fields of action are the promotion of innovations (not tech-
nologies) and the support of cooperation (see Table 11.3). On the one 
hand, this is the support for the development and use of new products 
and production processes; on the other hand, it is the instigation and 
support of cooperation in order to make use of potential synergetic ef-
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fects in the region. In this sense, the association pursues a structural pol-
icy strategy, aiming at the support and stabilization of regional clusters, 
which should be accomplished by a network and innovation oriented 
regional policy. 
 
 
Table 6.1: New fields of activities in the region of Stuttgart 
Cluster policy Employment promotion 
Promotion of  
innovations 
Regional reporting on important 
economic trends 
Marketing/image campaign Regional competitions 
 
 
 
The analysis of structures of regional networking has become an 
important topic of research over the last couple of years. Beneficial struc-
tures of regional networking might offer options for regions, for en-
dogenous economic growth and can make available the resources for 
cross-regional and cross-national activities. Regional networking can 
become a restriction if available resources are mainly or exclusively used 
for a mere reproduction of existing structures and are thus literally “con-
sumed.” This will lead to dangerous lock-in effects. In this case, closely 
knit relationships and established structures of intertwinement facilitate 
a strong orientation of actors towards established paths of development 
and well-proven problem solutions as a result. Regional networking 
structures, however, may also work as a springboard for the opening up 
of new cross-regional markets and resources. Thus, a bridge building 
between regional and global economic trends can be achieved. 
The success of Stuttgart was linked to the impression that there is a 
large degree of networking between economic actors going on. Research 
in the 1990s has repeatedly shown that this is a misconception. 
Nevertheless an objective demand developed among corporations for an 
increased amount of cooperation both within existing value chains (auto-
motive sector) as well as beyond (e.g. publishing, multimedia). This 
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holds true both for the level of inter organizational division of labor (be-
tween companies) as well as with respect to the innovative capabilities of 
companies, sectors, and clusters. The Association aims at filling this gap. 
Another exemplary development to be mentioned here with respect 
to the reform of institutions refers to the whole system of universities of 
applied sciences, which has undergone a process of structural change in 
the second half of the nineties. This type of universities was originally 
thought to fulfill the demands of the local industry. The severe economic 
crisis especially in the first half of the nineties and a rapidly decreasing 
demand for university graduates by regionally based companies, led to a 
dramatic situation (e.g. few new students) in many a university for ap-
plied sciences. The answer was twofold: on the one hand, traditional 
curricula have been sometimes even dramatically reduced, on the other 
hand new curricula have been developed, which aim at decreasing the 
dependency on specific regional or local demand structures. Even 
smaller universities are now faced with the demand to develop “world 
class” specializations. The regional orientation thus has been reduced 
and the importance of the openness to supra regional developments and 
actors strengthened. 
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7 Conclusion 
Grabher (1993) differentiated between three kinds of lock-ins that were 
considered to be at work in the Stuttgart region: functional lock-in, cog-
nitive lock-in and political lock-in. As previously discussed, functional 
lock-in implies that close cooperation within strong ties networks im-
pedes contacts with other regions: future trends that occur outside are 
overlooked and external resources are poorly identified and used. With 
respect to functional lock-in, we have analyzed the situation especially 
for the case of the automotive sector, which seemed to have successfully 
further developed its strategic position by developing itself into a truly 
global player and extending regional networks into a global arena. The 
merger of DaimlerChrysler is a symbol for this as well as the assertive-
ness of the growing supplier industry. 
Functional lock-ins are intensified through cognitive lock-ins. Per-
sonal relations lead to shared common ideas, feelings and believes. The 
fact, that entrepreneurs in Stuttgart did not notice Japanese competitors 
at an early stage and that they neglected to introduce countermeasures 
in time, was interpreted as a cognitive lock-in. Collective misinterpreta-
tions were the reasons why Stuttgart did not evaluated its industrial 
structure in the context of a global division of labor as well as a division 
of technological competences. With respect to cognitive lock-ins it can 
also be asserted that starting in the mid nineties Stuttgart began to re-
verse its image of being an old industry region. All major actors were 
looking towards new possibilities and options. Attempts to build up 
competencies beyond the core industries (as described in this chapter) 
are an impressive sign for this. 
Political lock-ins describe situations where economic development 
proceeds along historical trajectories that are supported by cooperative 
relations between political actors, trade unions, employers associations 
and other embedding institutions. As a political lock-in, we identify the 
fact that in Stuttgart the economic and technology policy of the regional 
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government was limited to modernization efforts within the core 
branches of the old economy. These branches received political support 
in order to stay competitive in globalized highly competitive markets. 
We have seen, however, that increasingly policy strategies have been 
introduced, to develop economic and structural alternatives for the re-
gion in order to loosen regional dependence on established industrial 
clusters. In this case it must be said, that the official policy on state and 
regional level has clearly changed focus and is attempting to support 
both the modernization of the old sectors as well as the promotion of 
new sectors. Our analysis has showed that important aspects in this re-
spect have been the policy of parallel institution building. 
Finally, it has to be said that the analysis of the mid-1990s might 
have been hampered by a generally held over-estimation of the devel-
opments in the new economy. The recent demise of this sector has 
shown that the mature industries do not necessarily need to look “old.” 
There is also a promising future for parts of the old industry. 
Nevertheless, the picture is not only bright. The development of 
strategies of institutional learning remains a challenge to be mastered. 
While many “institutionally poor” economic regions seek to adopt the 
seemingly exemplary institutions of other countries, Stuttgart is faced 
with the challenge of restructuring and transforming an exceedingly rich 
institutional landscape. These challenges put the well-considered (and 
concerted) modernization of regional institutions at the top of the 
agenda. The expedient further development of communication and co-
operation promoting institutions is therefore a central precondition for 
the design and rejuvenation of innovation-friendly environments. But it 
has also been demonstrated that institutional reforms and a transforma-
tion of existing productive structures is a difficult and extremely risky 
endeavor. Each of the three core sectors of the Stuttgart economy is fol-
lowing its own path of “learning” and features quite distinct paths of 
development. Among the three core sectors, only the automotive sector 
seems to be on a secure future oriented path. Furthermore, the institu-
tional reforms, the reworking of the image of the region of Stuttgart and 
the establishment of new networking and cooperation structures has so 
far not found its imprint in the overall data on regional economic per-
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formance. The success of this planned reorientation on the Baden-
Württemberg model level can only be judged in the future and will be 
dependent on continuing efforts. 
 
 
Notes 
1. European Commission, Second report on economic and social cohesion, 
Luxembourg 2001. NUTS is an acronym for “Nomenclature of Territorial 
Units for Statistics” – based on territorial definitions developed by the Statis-
tical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat) for producing regional 
statistics in the European Union. NUTS2 regions are sub-national units with 
between 0.8 million and 3.0 million inhabitants. 
2. The exact figures (2000) are 1,056,363 people employed in the Stuttgart re-
gion, 3,802,494 in Baden-Württemberg. Stuttgart’s share in Baden-
Württemberg’s employment is thus 27.8 percent. The numbers refer to per-
sons officially employed and registered in social security schemes. 
3. In 2003, Baden-Württemberg hosted 329 Steinbeis transfer centers. While 
Steinbeis increasingly creates new centers in other German and foreign re-
gions, Baden- Württemberg remains the main location of this organization 
(there are 121 Steinbeis centers in other parts of Germany and 14 centers 
abroad). 
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